

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED
STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies (CASS), Pune was registered on 21st September, 1992 under the Society's Registration Act, 1860, and as a Charitable Public Trust on 28th October, 1992, under the Bombay Charitable Public Trust Act of 1950. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India have accorded recognition to CASS as a Scientific and Industrial Research Institution. The Centre has been granted extension of IT exemption U/S.80G from 01.04.2008 to 31.03.2011 vide letter No.Pn/ CIT I/ 12A (a) / 80G / 396 / 2008-09 / 4587 dated 30.01.2009 and U/S.10(23C)(iv) for AY 2004-2005 and onwards vide Government of India Notification No.80/2007 dated 26.03.2007. Section 10(23C)(iv) gives hundred percent exemption for income of the Centre, and Section 80G gives fifty percent exemption to the donors.

The Centre aims at undertaking research and analysis of subjects relating to national and international security and development through seminars, discussions, publications at periodical intervals and close interaction with the faculty members and research students in allied disciplines in the Universities/Institutions and the Armed Forces. It expects to award research fellowships as soon as its corpus builds up and makes it possible. It aims to generate and promote interest among the academicians and public in these subjects with a view to making them alive to national security concerns. It has received very valuable support from the University of Pune in all its activities, specially from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies. It has an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Yashwantrao Chavan Academy of Development Administration (YASHADA) enabling mutual collaboration for making available their infrastructure, publications and teaching and research activities. The Centre has held a number of seminars, panel and group discussions.

ADDRESS :

Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies
M..M.D.W Potdar Complex, Pune University Campus
Pune - 411 007
Tele Fax No. : 020-25697516
Tel. No. : 020-25690182
Email : cass182@bsnl.in

Printed by On-Line Printers, Pune-58

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES



INDO-PAK RELATIONS

AND

THE USA

17th September, 2010

**CENTRE FOR ADVANCED
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

MEMBERS OF GOVERNING COUNCIL

Dr. Madhav Godbole : President
(Ex-Home Secretary, M
Govt. of India)

Air Chief Marshal (Retd) : M
H. Moolgavkar
(Ex-Chief of the Air Staff)

Admiral (Retd) : FM
J.G. Nadkarni : M
(Ex-Chief of the Naval Staff)

Prof. Gautam Sen : FM
(Former, DG & Member : M
Board of Trustees, IIE)

Shri MK Mangalmurti, : M
IFS (Retd)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
Noble Thamburaj
(Former Vice Chief of the
Army Staff)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
Amitav Mukherjee
(Former, DG, Air Def. Arty.)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
D.B. Shekatkar
(Former Comdt.,
The Infantry School)

Air Marshal (Retd) : Director
S. Kulkarni : M
(Former Comdt., NDC)

Gp Capt (Retd) S.G. Chitnis : Dy. Dir./Secy./Tr.
: M

FM : Founder Member
M : Member

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS

Shri R.D. Pradhan : M
(Ex-Governor,
Arunachal Pradesh)

Shri Abhay Firodia
Industrialist, Chairman,
Force Motors Ltd.

Air Cmde (Retd) Jasjit Singh
Director, Centre for Air Power Studies,
New Delhi

Shri Atul C. Kirloskar
Industrialist, Chairman & M.D.
Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd.

CONTENTS

Item	Page
Welcome by Director : Air Marshal (Retd) S. Kulkarni	2
Opening Remarks by the Chairman : Maj Gen (Retd) SG Pitre	3
Main Speakers : Brig (Retd) RR Palsokar	5
Closing Remarks by the Chairman : Maj Gen (Retd) SG Pitre	19
List of Participants	20

Editor : Gp Capt (Retd.) S. G. Chitnis, VSM Deputy Director, CASS

Address : Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies, MMDW Potdar
Complex, Pune University Campus, Pune 411007.
Telefax : 020-25697516 / Tel. : 020-25690182
E-mail : cass182@bsnl.in / casspune@yahoo.com
Website : www.cfass.org.in

WELCOME BY DIRECTOR

AIR MARSHAL (RETD) S. KULKARNI, PVSM,VM

Air Marshal (Retd) S. Kulkarni welcomed Maj Gen (Retd) SG Pitre, Chairman of today's function, and Brigadier (Retd) RR Palsokar, the Main Speaker and members and everyone present in the auditorium. He said that Brigadier (Retd) Palsokar is a very active member of the Centre. He retired after over 30 years service in the army in early 1993. During his army service he attended the British Army's Staff College at Camberley as also the US Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth from where he earned a Master's degree. His last operational command in the army was that of an infantry brigade as part of the IPKF in the Mullaittivu district of Sri Lanka. He has been writing on military subjects since long and now regularly for Sakal, the Marathi paper published out of Pune.

We are happy that another very active member of the Centre Maj Gen (Retd) SG Pitre is chairing the event. He is the founder chairman of NGO 'Horizon' dedicated to humanitarian demining. He was commissioned into Corps of Engineers in 1962 and retired from the Indian Army in 1998 after a span of 36 years of distinguished service. His columns appear widely in Marathi dailies on military matters. He has also authored a book on the Kashmir Imbroglia titled "Domel Te Kargil" in Marathi. Both the chairman and the Main Speaker have agreed to interact with the audience and have said that they look forward to such interaction.

OPENING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

MAJ GEN (RETD) SG PITRE

Pakistan is a nation in search of its identity ever since six decades of its inception. It has a limited potential in terms of both its hard power and soft power. Its initial importance accrued out of its status as a modern Muslim nation and in consequence, as a self-acclaimed leader of the Muslim States, which was short lived. The nation continues to overextend and outmatch itself in a vain bid to gain regional power status.

Obsessed with grabbing of Kashmir on the one hand and acquisition of strategic depth in Afghanistan on the other, the country has neglected its development and the civil society. It has a democratic constitution only in letter, sans any spirit, which has been more violated than implemented. More appropriately, it has editions of constitutions, formulated through whims and fancies of the dictators, who have occupied the centre-stage, with the democratic appearances merely as commercial breaks. To ask what is wrong with Pakistan is a nebulous and anomalous query. Better put it is, what is right with Pakistan. It is on every list of failing states. The world recognises Pakistan as a terrorist state.

Pakistan has only itself to blame for its sorry state. Mother of all insurgencies is presently smouldering in seven tribal agencies in its North, a dozen terrorist groups trained in Punjab and Sindh under the patronage of the ISI are operating in Kashmir and the Pashtun terrorists are playing a havoc in major Pakistani cities. Determined to topple the political system and the military-intelligence system, popularly termed as the 'deep state', the veritable terrorists aim to turn the State into, what Kamran Shafi calls as, "the Islamic Emirate of Pakistan".

Pakistan's geopolitical assertiveness is the result of its military's overwhelming staying power. Its bankrupt economy leans heavily on the IMF bailout and US aid. The Army drains out 25% of its budget.

That is precisely why the US can cajole the deep state to go after Pak Taliban and lose about 2000 soldiers in less than 15 months. Unfortunately for its Eastern neighbour, India, the Deep State has two definitions of terrorists; albeit on their western borders these are the terrorists, on the Eastern border the same animal is viewed as a freedom fighter.

India cannot watch the turmoil placidly. Pakistan is a neighbour which India would never like to choose, but 'we cannot fight the Whites'. We know the constraints of the US in welcoming the radical terrorist state as their strategic partner in the war against terrorism, probably the most abject paradox of the decade. It is a fact that the US needs Pakistan more than it needs India in the foreseeable future. Dr Henry Kissinger had succinctly put it as early as in the Eighties of the last century, when he said, "India is our friend, but Pakistan is our ally." It is a bitter pill that we have to swallow.

To analyse the matrix of this India-Pakistan-US, we are fortunate today to have Brigadier Ravi Palsokar, a soldier-scholar.

INDO-PAK RELATIONS AND THE USA

Chairman : SG Pitre
Main Speaker : RR Palsokar

PAPER PRESENTED BY BRIG (RETD) RR PALSOKAR

Ladies and gentlemen, it is always a privilege to stand before a CASS audience. Indo-Pak relations are a subject about which you are well informed and you are familiar with all the disputes between the two countries, from Siachen to Sir Creek. I have no intention of repeating the commonly known facts. However, we always look at Pakistan's problems from outside. What I propose to do is to look at these from inside out and see if I can project a different perspective.

It is my thesis that Indo-Pak relations cannot improve till Pakistan solves some of its more intractable problems which I call fault lines and at present they appear unsolvable till some systemic changes take place and there is little likelihood of such a thing happening in the near future. The recent floods in Pakistan have only served to accentuate the fault lines. Therefore, it is my contention that Indo-Pak relations will remain much as they are for some time to come. Whether anything can be done to improve relations remains a matter of conjecture and good hope. You may not agree with a lot of what I say. It might help to know that even in my house I am in a minority of one.

Fault Lines

My remit is to look at Indo-Pak relations and the US. I propose to exceed this brief and at a later stage also drag China into this equation. Let me start with the first fault line which is FATA.

We are all aware of the seven tribal agencies of FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) – starting from the North, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram and North and South Waziristan. In six of these agencies (bar Orakzai because it does not have a contiguous border with Afghanistan) the tribes are spread on both sides of the Durand Line. Look now at the tribal structure. Since



the British subjugation of the tribes in late 19th, early 20th century, tribal authority has vested in the hands of tribal chiefs, the Maliks. The British had left the Maliks to their own devices so long as they did not interfere with the federal territory which in this case consisted of the roads and cantonments. The Mullas had little authority in the Pashtun tribal structure save for matters related to prayers, births, deaths, marriages, marital strife and so on. The Mulla drew his authority from the patronage of the Malik. The British kept the Maliks on their side by handing over all monetary assistance to the Malik and did not interfere with the way he ruled or lorded it over his tribe. So it was in the interest of the tribal head to keep the system going. Occasionally the British had to use force to keep a recalcitrant Malik or tribe in line and this they did so under the authority of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901. The forces used were the Frontier Constabulary aided by the army. After independence,

Pakistan continued with the same policy and it might be of interest to know that FCR 1901 is still in force. Lest we shake our heads, we need to remember that the Indian Police Act of 1861 is still in force in our country.


This tribal arrangement continued into the 1970s and was disturbed by the rise of the Afghan Mujahedeen and the Taliban after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With the advent of the Taliban rose the authority of the Mullas and what we are seeing today is that the tribal structure is being disturbed because there is a tussle for authority between the tribal heads the Maliks and the Mullas. The Taliban are constantly striking at tribal authority by suicide attacks against jirgas and lashkars, or the secular authorities such as the police and administrative functionaries. At present the Taliban are ascendant and there appears no federal authority besides the army, capable of dealing with them. A similar situation exists in the neighbouring Malakand division consisting of Chitral, Dir, Swat and Malakand. Here the Malik's place was taken by the Wali who was the ruler, who in turn was replaced by the District Commissioner. Fact is that the higher courts are in Peshawar and Islamabad and the speedy justice that used to be provided by the Wali is no longer available. The Taliban are only too ready to provide instant justice through the Mulla and the Sharia and enforce it through the power of the gun. The point I am making is that in NWFP, Central authority is in tatters, tribal authority is under siege and the religious authority is becoming stronger. The Pakistani government is incapable of dealing with this. Matters are made worse by the tribes' code of Pashtunwali which is based on honour, revenge and hospitality. A guest who seeks refuge cannot be turned away. So even foreign militants are given refuge and hence the drone strikes. (Many refugees from the tribal areas migrate to Karachi where there is a large Pashtun community and this in turn brings them into conflict with Sindhis and Mohajirs, which is why we see such horrific riots in that city).

I have taken some time over this because until the tribal areas come into the mainstream, these problems will remain.

Water

Let me next take the issue of water. We are getting used to hearing that the Indus Water Treaty is inequitable and so on. In actual fact, more water flows into Pakistan than agreed upon because we do not use all that we are entitled to. But in Pakistan the problem is different. The dominant Punjab province has ensured its own irrigation and the waters of the Indus are denied to large parts of Sind and Baluchistan. Till I started researching this subject, I did not know that an organisation from Sindh has a case registered with the UN that Pakistan was not providing adequate water to Sindh province.

The map shows the extent to which the Indus is dammed to assist Punjabi agriculture.



Boundaries shown in the Map are neither accurate nor official

“It is the same everywhere in Sindh: peasants, farmers and fisherfolk protesting about water shortages; almost daily, in some small town or village, an anti-dam march ... But the ... government, far away in Northern Punjab, does not listen to farmers from the (Indus) Delta. Money lies in the cotton fields of Punjab and Northern Sindh – and the power to control the country resides in a centralised irrigation policy dictated over 100 years ago by imperial engineers.”

Empires of the Indus by Alice Albinia, p.51

Army and the ISI

The third problem is the Army. It is the only institution left in Pakistan which has any credibility, (if one does not count Islamic movements such as the LeT or JuD, or Falah e Insaniyat or Jamat e Islami). The similarity between our two armies is remarkable, the regimental system, training procedures and infrastructure, same prejudices against politicians and so on. Even then, over the last 60 years differences too have emerged. First of these, relates to the business empire built up by the army by way of the Fauji Foundation and the opportunities it offers both serving and retired officers. Second, I tried to find some facts on Defence Colonies where prime land is given to serving and retired officers, but was not able to do so. This latter is a particularly sore point with civilians, but given the state of affairs in that country, no one has yet been able to do anything about it. This makes it unlikely that the army in the foreseeable future will do anything to jeopardise this gravy train. What this also ensures is that senior army officers are secure and that their subordinates have a carrot dangling before them at all times and so will not buck the system. Another major difference is the manner in which the army has been Islamised. While it is common to blame General Zia ul Haq for this, we need to recognise that it gets impetus from the rank and file or else it would have been discarded a long time ago. Today, the officers come from middle and lower middle classes of the Society as well from small towns and villages including the rural affluent, unlike their predecessors who tended to be more anglicised. General Kayani is the son of an NCO. You would be surprised to know that after the 1971 defeat, the first demand of the officers was that the Messes become dry. So Islamisation of the army will remain a fact of life.

Another Fault Line is the control of the ISI. It has been pointed out to me that in most countries around the world, the agency for external intelligence comes under the government and not the military. The stranglehold that the Pak army has on the ISI leads one to the conclusion that in Pakistan the army's imprimatur on foreign policy will never be removed. At the same time, there has been no development of political or bureaucratic culture in Pakistan. Even a balanced and responsible journalist such as Najam Sethi says that

rightfully Kashmir should have gone to Pakistan and since this did not happen, it allowed the military to assume a dominant role in the country which in turn stunted the growth of political and bureaucratic culture. (Interview with Riz Khan on Al Jazeera on 15 August 2010). This is as specious an argument as any.

The last fault line is the one that is in the process of being created. We are still not clear about the magnitude of the devastation that the recent flooding has caused (see map below) and the amount of time and money that will be required for rehabilitation. What is happening is that because the Federal Authorities are incompetent and incapable, it is only the Army to some extent and militant fundamentalist organisations such as Falah-e-Insaniyat and Jamat-e-Islami, by doing solid and sincere relief work in flood affected areas which are gaining credibility and popularity. Once some order is restored, these fundamentalist organisations are bound to come in conflict with the civilian government as also the army. It is my opinion that these floods and their aftermath are likely to be a game-changer in Pakistan's future, because the fundamentalists will become stronger which in turn will result in major changes in the power equation between various authorities. So a turbulent period is in store for Pakistan and its neighbors.



Boundaries shown on the map are neither accurate nor official

Map showing flooding.

Geo-Strategic Issues

Even as we look at Indo-Pak relations, we have to recognise the dynamics of Pakistan's relations with its immediate neighbours and traditional allies. One point is now clear to the whole world that Pakistan is a problem and a security threat globally. A very general overview is as follows:

Pak-Iran relations are ambivalent to say the least. There is a Shia-Sunni dimension as also Pak-Afghan relations that impinge on areas bordering Iran. The Zaranj-Delaram highway is relevant in this context. Iran views the Af-Pak policy of the USA and the presence of American troops in Afghanistan with a certain amount of wariness, which is but natural given the current state of Iran-US relations.

Pak-Saudi Arabia relations are past their previous cosiness. Even Saudi Arabia is wary of what is happening in Af-Pak and the rise of fundamentalism in Pakistan.

The third issue is Pak nuclear capability. Leave aside for the moment, Indo-Pak nuclear rivalry, one common global fear is that a terrorist organisation will be able to get hold of a nuclear weapon through Pakistan. This nightmare is not as unreal as it may appear at first sight. And it worries the world more than the Indo-Pak stand-off.

Last is the Pak-China axis – KKH, Gwadar Port, presence of Chinese troops in Gilgit and Baltistan. Beyond a certain point, this relationship will affect US-Pak relations, because an incipient US-China rivalry is developing around the world and the Af-Pak region is one of those areas where both countries have conflicting interests. Finally, Sino-Pak friendship is as much a reality as Sino-Indian rivalry. Chinese intentions in Afghanistan remain restricted at present to accessing natural resources. The point I want to make is that at present due to the situation in Afghanistan and the aid being provided, US plays a more dominant role in Pak affairs than China.

But because of the Afghanistan problem, the main strategic issue in Pakistan is the relationship with the US.

Pakistan – Us Relations

In May this year (2010), the Obama administration published its National Security Policy. Analysis of this policy gives a good overview of US-Pak relationship and much of how the strategic situation plays out in Pakistan will depend upon what happens in Afghanistan where the US policy is being hotly debated within the US. Summarising, the main issues are as follows:

US Aims and Objectives

- a) Domestic politics is a dominant factor in strategy setting. The President is always tied to the election cycle in America as also his re-election.
- b) For decades, the United States has treated Pakistan without sufficient regard to the long term. U.S. efforts have largely been reactive to events and directed at the particular regime in power, as opposed to the country or region as a whole.
- c) As a partner in the global war on terror, Pakistan has been criticized by the U.S. for a lack of resolve in engaging the Taliban, despite having received more foreign aid from the U.S. than most countries. For example, the U.S. has provided \$12 billion in aid since 9/11, most of it in military assistance. There is now a proposal in Congress, the Kerry-Lugar Bill, to provide \$1.5 billion in non-military assistance per year for five years, with another \$7.5 billion for the following five years. In addition, military assistance will be \$3 billion per year for the next five years. From the early 1950s until last year, Pakistan has received \$73 billion in aid from all sources. Since the Mumbai attacks in 2009, Pakistan has received aid or commitments of \$23 billion, including a \$7.6 billion IMF loan (source: Japan Times, April 25, 2009). Recently, the International

Monetary Fund approved Pakistan's request for an additional \$4 billion in aid funds.

Pak Objectives

- a) The Pakistani objective has been, in large part, to secure foreign aid and to assure regime survival – with enough engagement with the Taliban to placate the U.S., but not enough to provoke a domestic crisis or coup d'état by Taliban members or sympathizers within the army and ISI.
- b) Further, Pakistan has used the strategic threat of India to justify the high profile and increasing strength of its professional army, the most credible of its institutions. The so called India threat is also used to rally public opinion.
- c) Pakistan seeks strategic depth in Afghanistan. What does it mean? Kayani has been quoted to say that all they want is a, 'peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan – nothing less, nothing more – Pakistan cannot colonise Afghanistan, history tells us that this nation has never accepted foreign rule.' (Imtiaz Gul – The Al Qaeda Connection, p.25.) What he really means is that they want Afghanistan as a client state, where there is no Indian influence, so that there is no threat of any kind from that direction. The Indian consular presence in Jalalabad and Kandahar is seen as a threat to destabilize Baluchistan.
- d) The Pakistani public believes that Kashmir rightly belongs to them, and this view is unlikely to change.

U.S. Intentions – Pakistan's Perceptions

- a) There is a widespread perception in Pakistan that the U.S. is interested only in its own selfish objectives, such as counterterrorism, military engagement with the Taliban, and the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons.
- b) Influential Pakistanis attribute U.S. interest in Pakistan to shared borders with China and Iran, and its proximity to Russia and the Caspian oil region.
- c) The presence of the U.S. coalition in Afghanistan is identified as a cause of instability in FATA and NWFP, in view of the conflict being pushed into Pakistan. Most Pakistanis believe that prior to 9/11, the situation in those areas was relatively manageable.
- d) There is also a view that the lack of hands-on monitoring of U.S. aid, administered over decades, has contributed to a culture of corruption of major proportions. Furthermore, some observers maintain that the U.S. will abandon Pakistan as soon as U.S. objectives are substantially met—i.e. suppression of the Taliban and its influence. In the meantime, the U.S. is perceived as supporting an unstable and corrupt Pakistani government, all the while professing its commitment to democracy.
- e) The common people in Pakistan harbour anger both toward its own government and the United States, which they consider a facilitator of corruption. The Predator drone strikes, with their collateral civilian casualties, have incensed rural populations. The intelligentsia continues to be cynical about the U.S. and its intentions.

Indo-Pak Relations

It is a moot point whether at present Pakistan is peripheral to India's interests or vice versa. The recent floods have pushed all issues into the background or else we would have heard much activity in the UN about Indian atrocities in Kashmir and so on. But the core question remains, how do we maintain a coherent policy towards Pakistan.

We always look at Pakistan through a fixed prism. It is my opinion that we need to have a more nuanced relationship. Officially, remain at an arm's distance, yet at the same time encourage the soft contacts, educational, newspapers, cultural and so on. Last time I said this, I had my head bitten off, with the suggestion that it is no use taking anything but a hard line against Pakistan. We can discuss this. Having seen what is happening in FATA, radicalisation of certain segments of society in Pakistan and the Islamophobia sweeping the western world, I feel that our syncretic Islam tradition and the 160 million Muslims we have in our country are a bulwark of defence against radicalisation. We need to work on this, but we could spoil it easily.

Our internal security environment, whether Kashmir or the North-East or Left Wing Extremism weakens our clout in the rest of the world, despite the economic progress we have made. Why this is so is a separate issue, but no doubt it impacts on our relations with the rest of the world.

Concluded

End Notes:

Source: for analysis of US-Pak relations and the recommendations given below, National Strategy Forum, a not for profit organisation based in Chicago, Illinois, USA.

Recommendations of NSF

- a) First, it must be recognized that there is no quick fix; it may take a decade or more to stabilize this part of South Asia.

- b) Second, the focus of the Pakistan government, as well as that of the U.S. and other countries that seek a stable Pakistan, should be on offering a message of hope to the people of Af-Pak as a counter to the Taliban and other extremists' recruitment and appeal. This is a battle of ideas for the minds of young people who have no alternative prospects in life. With a renewed effort at effective public diplomacy, leveraging global telecommunications, the U.S. may be able to sway public opinion in its favour and strike a blow to the Taliban stronghold.
- c) Third, the long-term solution is the provision of social services to the Pakistani people. The recent floods have exacerbated matters. U.S. aid should be directed at education, public health, food, and basic social service needs and at rural reconstruction projects to provide opportunities for employment.
- d) Fourth, a new humanitarian aid distribution and oversight mechanism must be developed and should involve official U.S., foreign NGOs, or neutral party advisors as monitors. Without a robust and hands-on process for controlling and accounting for the distribution, receipt, and expenditure of aid monies, the U.S. will simply perpetuate the pervasive culture of corruption.
- e) Fifth, the U.S. should emphasize and accelerate the training of the Pakistan army in CI, HUMINT, and psychological operations. Continued military aid should be subjected to the same control and scrutiny as humanitarian aid, so that there is confidence that U.S. funding is directed at equipping the Pakistan army for a new type of warfare, and not for more armour, artillery, and aircraft to be deployed against India.
- f) Sixth, the U.S. should engage religious leaders constructively. Many are moderates who believe that the Taliban is distorting Islam to further its objectives. The power and communications network of the approximately 20,000 madrassas should be used, rather

- g) than feared. Seventh, India needs to offer a positive and public signal to Pakistan. It must recognize that if Pakistan disintegrates, it will have a failed nuclear armed territory on its frontiers with a likely hostile and unpredictable orientation. While India's efforts to ease tensions over Kashmir will have minimal effect on the motivation for the Taliban insurgency in Af-Pak, they would allow Pakistan to redeploy some of its army, and they would be seen to affirm that Pakistan is a respected sovereign power, not a little brother to be patronized. India's influence is unavoidable, and it can also be a very positive force. The words India uses matter. Even more helpful would be an initial and modest Indian pullback initiated by India from the Line of Control in Kashmir, then reciprocated by Pakistan. These actions would be largely symbolic, but symbolism matters.
- h) Eighth, Pakistan should be encouraged to reciprocate Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India as envisioned by GATT, which was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Pakistan's role in world trade, and more broadly in free markets, needs further study and attention. It has not prospered the way the Indian middle class has since the Indian economy was liberalized 1991. Advice from India on economic reforms and lessons learned, if offered without looking patronizing, would be useful.
- j) Ninth, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India must be brought to the table together to formulate a long term strategy formulated to share intelligence, to use the network of madrassas, and to leverage the strengths of each country for the benefit of the others. Thus far, the public dialogue has been mostly accusatory, with too much scolding and finger pointing about who is responsible for bad relations.

One of the highest priorities for the U.S. may be to restore domestic optimism.

Given the realities of the election cycle, a presidential time horizon for a strategic objective is approximately eight years. Year one: the candidate's presidential campaign and the election, followed by the first year's presidential rush to achieve something great. However, the president and policymaking staff may have difficulty getting up to speed. Years two and three are governed by political manoeuvring for the mid-term Congressional elections and preparations for the president's second election campaign. The president's second term is largely spent dealing with the consequences of the actions initiated in the first term. The last year of the president's second term focuses on legacy.

Pakistan's Unmet Needs and the Message of the Taliban

- a) The economy of Pakistan has weakened to the point that a \$7.6 billion emergency IMF loan was announced in November 2008. Added to that is a rate of inflation that reached 25 percent late last year, although it is now receding somewhat.
- b) There are other negative statistics (source - CIA World Factbook). Much of the 176 million population is separated from the mainstream and either conducts subsistence agriculture or lives in urban squalor. Nearly 40 percent of the people are under the age of fifteen, with a median age of about 21. Many in urban and rural areas have no prospects for any meaningful employment or life ahead of them. Per capita GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) is \$2,600. Also, low literacy rates inhibit broad-based communications: male literacy is 63 percent and female literacy is 36 percent.
- c) The information vacuum created by the absence of radios and televisions in remote areas creates fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Information is often passed by word of mouth, and is frequently anti-U.S.

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

MAJ GEN (RETD) SG PITRE

We had a very illuminating and an 'out-of box' presentation by Brigadier Palsokar. Perusing his script, I felt that he had dealt rather briefly with the Indo- Pak portion of the relations. He has stated during the course of his presentation that unless Pakistan sorts out its problems, the Indo-Pak relations cannot improve. Well, that is one view. He has also strongly advocated that we need to change our prism of looking towards our neighbour.

A faultline that may seek prominence in future in Indo-Pak relations, which was not touched today, is the vexing issue of Baluchistan. Pakistan alleges that Indian agents located in Afghanistan and in the Gulf Region are inflaming the passions of four separatist groups. The groups have allegedly massacred 350 non-Baluch residents of the region. Pakistan lays the blame squarely on India. Without going into the validity or otherwise of their claim, prophylactic action needs to be initiated.

An interesting discussion ensued apropos the lecture and a variety of points were made by the participants. As brought out, such an august and well-informed audience must be permitted the same amount of time as given to the presenter. I recommend that this be factored in while planning the future events. It is in the active response of the audience that the credit and the merit of Brigadier Palsokar's presentation today lies. I richly complement and thank him for his brilliant and erudite presentation.

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES
CASS PUBLICATIONS

Sl. SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS No.	Date of Seminar
1. "Defence and Industry"	17 May 93
2. "Use of Force in Internal Peace Keeping"	04 Dec.93
3. 22-23 Nov.94	
4. "First SLK Memorial Lecture?"	05 Jun. 95
5. "Human Rights : Law and Order in India"	30 Sep. 95
6. "The Emerging Security Environment in South East Asia with Special Reference to Myanmar : Political, Economic and Military Implication for India"	02-03 Dec.95
7. "India 2020 : An Agenda for the Nation" by Maj Gen (Retd) KS Pendse.	Feb. 96
8. India : The Nuclear Challenge" by Lt Gen (Retd) EA Vas, Maj Gen (Retd) KS Pendse, Dr. Col (Retd) AA Athale.	Mar. 96
9. "Challenges to India's National Security And India's Defence Preparedness"	20-21 Apr. 96
10. "Citizens Rights and Indian Democracy" "Second SLK Memorial Lecture" by Dr. P.C. Alexander, Governor of Maharashtra	20 Jul. 96
11. "Challenges of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Implications for India"	28 Aug. 96
12. "Regional Security Environment To The North-West of India With Special Reference To Afghanistan."	21-22 Mar. 97
13. "Changing Scenario of The Constitutional Values" "Third SLK Memorial Lecture" by Justice AM Ahmadi, Former Chief Justice of India	02 Aug. 97

Sl. SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS No.	Date of Seminar
14. "Information Warfare"	24 Sep. 97
15. "Laws of War"	09 Jan. 98
16. "Indian Ocean - The Challenges Ahead"	06-07 Mar. 98
17. "The Changing Pattern of India's Relations with America" "Fourth SLK Memorial Lecture" by Dr.Abid Hussain, Vice Chairman, Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Contemporary Studies.	03 Jul. 98
18. "Pokhran II and its Implications"	01 Sep. 98
19. "Nuclear India And The World"	08 Sep. 98
20. "The Challenge of Terrorism"	29 Oct. 98
21. "Foreign Policy Imperatives For Nuclear India"	26-27 Feb. 99
22. "On Building a Globally Competitive Indian Industry : The Role of Research & Technology?" "Fifth SLK Memorial Lecture?" Scientific & Industrial Research,	22 Jul. 99
23. "Challenges of J&K"	04 Feb. 00
24. "Indo-Pak Relations : Challenges Ahead"	30-31 Mar. 00
25. "Insurgency In India - Causes & Perspectives"	28 Dec. 00
26. "Self Reliant Defence and Indian Industry" "SLK Memorial Lecture - 2000" by Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Convener, NSAB	18 Jul. 00
27. "Governance In India : Challenges Ahead"	25 Jan. 01
28. "India and China by 2020 : Political, Economic Sociological and Military Perspectives"	14-15 Mar. 01
29. "Global Terrorism And India's Response"	19-20 Mar.02
30. "Globalization And Its Impact" "SLK Memorial Lecture - 2002" by Dr. C. Rangarajan, Governor, Andhra Pradesh	24 April 02

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
31.	"Governance In India" "Shri N.K. Firodia Memorial Seminar : 2002"	03 Oct.02
32.	"Globalisation And India"	19 Mar.03
33.	"Elections And Democracy in India" "Shri N.K. Firodia Memorial Seminar : 2004" by Mr. J.M. Lyngdoh, former Chief Election Commissioner, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, former Justice of Supreme Court	17 Feb.04
34.	"Comprehensive Security : Need of the Hour"	25-26 Feb.04
35.	"Ombudsman, Lokayuktas, Lokpals ; Concept and Working, with Special Reference to State of Maharashtra"	25 Mar.04
36.	"Comprehensive Security II : Economic And Internal Security"	03 Mar.05
37.	"India And Its Neighbours : A Regional Security Perspective"	04 Jan.06
38.	"Probity And Propriety In Public Life" "Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Seminar:2006" by Shri Milind Gadgil, Journalist.	3 Feb.06
39.	"Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Seminar:2007" by Dr.DN Dhanagare, former Vice Chancellor, Shivaji University, Kolhapur; Ambassador PV Joshi, IFS Addl.Secy., MEA and presently with Home Ministry for last two years	13 Mar.07
40.	"Emerging World Order And Sino Indian Relations"	21 Mar.07
41.	"Aerospace Power in a Changing National Security Environment" "Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture:2007" by Air Chief Marshal FH Major, PVSM, AVSM, SC, VSM, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff	28 Jul.07

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
42.	"Future Environment, Perceived Threat Perceptions and Imperatives in Response" Brigadier N B Grant Memorial Lecture : 2007" by Lt Gen N. Thamburaj, SM, G.O.C.in.C., HQ, Southern Command	02 Dec.07
43.	"Indian Democracy : Its strengths and weaknsses" Professor S. V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture" by Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar,	25 May,08
44.	"India's Strategic Environment And Its Implications for Military Modernisation" Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Dr. Bharat Karnad	08 Jul.08
45.	"Indo-US Relations : The Changing Perspective"	22 Oct.08
46.	"Challenges Before the Fifteenth Lok Sabha" "Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture" by Dr. Madhav Godbole, former Home Secretary, Govt. of India	26 May,09
47.	"Secularism in India : Meaning and Practice" "Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Lecture" by Justice Narendra Chapalgaonkar	14 May,10
48.	"Right to Information : Reality and Rhetoric" "Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture" by Mr. Wajahat Habibullaj, Chief Information Commissioner, Govt. of India	26 May,10
49.	"West Asia : A Factor in India's Security and Foreign Relations"	21 Apr.10
50.	" Essentials of an Aerospace Power : India Context" "Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Air Marshal PK Barbora, PVSM, VM, ADC, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, IAF	09 July 10
51.	"Naxalism and Maoism and Indian Army"	26 Aug.10
52.	"Indo-Pak Relations and The USA"	17 Sep.10